University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 27
Number 1 Summer/Fall 1996

Article 13

1996

Recent Developments: Sasaki v. Class: Mention of
Federal Statutory Cap on Non-Economic Damages
during Closing Arguments by Plaintiff 's Counsel
Violated the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Latina Burse

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Burse, Latina (1996) "Recent Developments: Sasaki v. Class: Mention of Federal Statutory Cap on Non-Economic Damages during
Closing Arguments by Plaintiff 's Counsel Violated the Civil Rights Act of 1991," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 27 : No. 1 ,
Article 13.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol27/iss1/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Recent Developments

Sasaki v. Class

I

n this case of first impression, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed and remanded the
issue of damages on the basis of
plaintiff s counsel's reference to
the federal statutory non-economic
damages cap during closing arguments. In Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d
232 (4th Cir. 1996), the court held
that Congress intended to prohibit
both judges and attorneys from
mentioning the cap so juries would
not be compelled to adjust the
verdicts upward or downward to
account for the caps.
Mee Sook Sasaki ("Sasaki")
filed suit against her employer,
JL W Produce, and its president,
Robert Class ("Class"), alleging
that Class sexually harassed her for
several years in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). Sasaki
also alleged that Class assaulted
and battered her in violation of
Maryland law. During closing
arguments, Sasaki's counsel argued that the jury could award
Sasaki up to $50,000 in compensatory damages for emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, and mental anguish in her sexual harassment claim. Defense counsel's
objection was overruled. Sasaki's
counsel continued his argument by
noting that state law permitted the
jury to award Sasaki up to
$500,000 for each battery.
The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Sasaki and awarded her
$61,250 for her sexual harassment
claim, $150,000 for her assault and
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battery claims, and $65,000 in
punitive damages. The trial court,
however, denied Sasaki's request
for attorney's fees and costs because she received "generous"
damage awards totaling $276,250.
Class appealed on several
grounds. First, Class argued that
the trial court's erroneous permission of Sasaki's counsel to reference the federal statutory damages
cap during closing arguments violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2).
Second, Class argued that the trial
judge improperly refused voir dire
of prospective jurors to determine
if any had experienced sexual
harassment. Third, Class appealed
several evidentiary and instructional errors. Sasaki cross-appealed
contending that the trial judge
abused his discretion when he
denied her request for attorney's
fees.
Sasaki asserted three defenses
to Class's first argument. First,
Sasaki argued that § 1981 a( c )(2)
pertained only to the judiciary
because the statute specifically

stated that the "court" shall not
inform the jury of the damages
cap. Sasaki, 92 F.3d at 236. The
court agreed that the statute specifically prohibited the court from
making reference to the cap. The
court held, however, that the statute's legislative history indicated
that Congress intended to prohibit
both judges and attorneys from
informing the jury of the damages
cap. Id. Specifically, Congress
enacted the bill to ensure that the
jury would not be pressured to
adjust the damage awards upward
or downward to account for the
federal statutory damages cap. ld.
Therefore, the court held, limiting
this restriction to judges would, in
effect, undermine congressional
intent. Id.
Second, Sasaki argued Class
opened the door to her counsel's
statement during closing arguments when they portrayed her
as a greedy person seeking millions of dollars. Id. The court
disagreed and held that counsel's
reference to the federal damages
cap did not dispel the inference
that she was greedy, inasmuch as
Sasaki did ask the jury to award
her millions of dollars on her state
law claims. Id.
Finally, Sasaki argued, assuming arguendo that her counsel's
statement was error, the error did
not harm or prejudice Class pursuant to Rule 61 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Jd. The court,
however, held that counsel's reference to the federal damages cap
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 47
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accomplished exactly what Congress intended to prevent. N amely, the reference pressured the jury
to adjust their award to account for
the damages cap. Id. at 237.
Essentially, the court found
that counsel's closing argument
was interpreted by the jury to
award Sasaki more for her state
law claim because of the federal
damages cap. This finding was
evidenced by the fact that the jury
awarded Sasaki $150,000 for the
"lesser included state conduct and
injury." Id. As a result, the court
held that "when a jury's damages
award itself indicates so strongly
that the error substantially influenced the jury verdict, the error
cannot be dismissed as harmless."
Id.

For this reason, the court remanded on the issue of damages.
Id. at 238. The court held, however, that Sasaki's counsel's reference to the federal statutory damages cap in no way affected the
jury's findings that Class was liable and had acted willfully and
maliciously. Id. Therefore, the
jury's verdict on liability and the
propriety of punitive damages was
affirmed. Id.
Class's second argument on
appeal was that the trial judge improperly denied Class the right to
an unbiased jury by refusing to ask
prospective jurors whether they
had ever been sexually harassed in
the workplace. The court determined, after reviewing all voir dire
questions presented by the parties,
that the trial court's voir dire "adequately covered the personal experiences ... [of] the jurors ... [and
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 48

therefore] it was unnecessary for
the court to go to any great lengths
to ensure that jurors revealed their
potential prejudices." Id. at 2404l.
Class's third argument alleged
that the trial court failed to elaborate its jury instructions to include
the four factors, outlined in Harris
v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 u.S. 17
(1993), in determining whether
Class's harassment created a hostile environment. The court held
that the trial judge did not abuse its
discretion for the "instructions
construed as whole, and in light of
the whole record, adequately informed the jury of the controlling
legal principles without misleading
or confusing the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party." Id. at
242. (quoting Spell v. McDaniel,
824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027
(1988)).
Sasaki's cross-appeal argued
that the trial judge improperly refused to award her attorney's fees
because of the generous award she
received. The court agreed that a
generous award on damages was
not a proper rationale for the denial
of attorney's fees. Id. at 243.
Therefore, in addition to the issue
of damages, the court remanded
for reconsideration the appropriateness of attorney's fees in this
case.
The ruling in Sasaki v. Class
reflects the Fourth Circuit's
attempt to interpret 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(c)(2) consistent with the
public policy considerations exemplified in the legislative history of
the statute. By remanding this

case for a new trial limited to the
issues of damages and attorneys
fees, the court's message is that
juries must make determinations of
damages solely by weighing the
evidence.
Furthermore, juries
should not be compelled to adjust
the verdicts upward or downward
to account for the caps. Therefore,
in order to avoid the expense of a
new trial, attorneys should refrain
from mentioning to the jury any
limitations in awarding noneconomic damages. Nothing in
this case, however, seems to prevent attorneys from requesting a
specific amount in damage awards.

